Mexican Drug Cartels: International Terror

By Jake Babbish

When imagining the fentanyl crisis gripping the United States and Canada, one may picture drug smugglers at the southern border of the United States.[1]  However, the scope of Mexican drug cartel operations goes beyond just North, South, and Central America.  The global demand for cocaine and other synthetic drugs is on the rise.[2]  As a way to meet this rising demand, drug cartels in Mexico, such as the Sinaloa Cartel and the Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generacìon (CJNG), have created a global network of criminal enterprises to control the global drug trade.[3]  As a response, some U.S. lawmakers have called for a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) designation of the Mexican drug cartels.[4]

 This shift to global distribution has created an international network of suppliers, distributors, and buyers requiring cooperation between criminal enterprises reaching Europe, the Middle East, and even Asia.[5]  “Mexico’s crime organizations use the same strategies as any other business: the seek to maximize profit, they outsource to specialists – and they adapt constantly to reflect changing international regulations.”[6]

Not long ago, the mountains of the Sinaloa and Guerrero states were home to smaller plantations, where subsistence farmers made a living by cultivating marijuana and opium poppies.[7] Now, however, those same crops are being replaced by clandestine laboratories churning out shipments of synthetic drugs.[8]  One reason for this shift in product is due to fentanyl being extraordinarily profitable to produce.[9] Where opium poppies requires acres of land and months of care, fentanyl requires a smaller workforce and infrastructure.[10] A 2019 Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) report estimated that each fentanyl pill costs only $1 to produce and can be resold in the U.S. for at least ten times as much.[11]

The rise of the cartels can be traced to a combination of domestic and international factors.[12]  Domestically, the cartels, historically, have used their profits to pay off politicians, judges, and officers within the Mexican government for decades.[13]  Internationally, the drug cartels filled a void in the global drug trade once U.S. agencies, like the DEA, broke up and dismantled Caribbean networks used by Colombian cartels in the 1980s to smuggle cocaine.[14]  At the time, these Mexican organizations were considered “gangs” and shifted from being couriers for Colombian cartels, such as Pablo Escobar’s Medellin Cartel, to becoming “wholesalers” on a global scale. [15]  Today, Mexican Drug Cartels have expanded their operations around the world, to include even the European Union and Asia.[16]

Mexican Cartel Activity in Europe

With the help of the Mexican cartels, more cocaine than ever is entering European markets, which is evidenced by the establishment of operations in countries such as the Netherlands, Belgium, Italy, and Spain.[17]  To increase cooperation and efficiency, the cartels have embedded personnel into European criminal networks to assist in their illegal operations.[18]  These includes providing facilitators such as brokers to provide shipping and transportations services, laboratory specialists to educate other criminal organizations on “cooking” meth and fentanyl, envoys of corrupt officials, and even money laundering service providers.[19]  These networks are known to traffic both methamphetamine and cocaine to EU ports for further distribution within the EU or to transit the drugs to more lucrative markets such as Asia and Oceania.[20]

Mexican Drug Cartel Activity in Asia

In the early 2000s, cartels, like the Sinaloa, began developing import and export networks in Asia.[21]  These developments have driven a provocative “foreign policy” amongst competing cartels securing supply networks for illegal drug operations.[22]  Much of the Asian market efforts have focused on Australia and New Zealand where prices for cocaine can be up to three times higher than in the European market.[23]  Additionally, the chemicals used for producing synthetic drugs like meth and fentanyl are primarily produced in Asian countries like China.[24]

Mexican marines apprehend drug cartel members and contraband. Image courtesy of Yuri Cortez/AFP via Getty Images.

Like meth, cartels typically synthesize fentanyl at lab facilities in Mexico. This process is done with chemicals known as precursors.[25]  These precursors can be used to produce legal chemicals or for illegal uses such as “cooking” meth and fentanyl.[26]  China is the predominant source of precursor chemicals for the Mexican drug cartels, primarily the Sinaloa Cartel and the Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generacìon (CJNG).[27]  The U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) stated in December 2022 that the agency seized more than 10,000 pounds of fentanyl powder in the U.S. in 2022, while noting that “[m]ost of the fentanyl being trafficked by the Sinaloa and CJNC Cartels is being mass-produced at secret factories in Mexico with chemicals sourced largely from China.”[28]

What Can be Done?

The question remains: how can the cartels be stopped?  The answer may come in different forms, but according to some U.S. lawmakers, designating the Mexican drug cartels as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO) may be a start.[29]  Advocates for this designation propose that likening cartels to terrorist would “beef up” U.S. law enforcement response, allowing for tougher sanctions and increased criminal penalties.[30]  Additionally, this designation could open the door for U.S. military action against cartel operation, like targeted drone strikes on active laboratories or sending Special Forces to capture cartel leadership.[31]  However, Andrés Manuel Lopez Obrador, the president of Mexico, has rejected using American military force inside Mexico’s borders and has called potential FTO designations “propaganda.”[32]  If the US took military action in Mexico without permission, it would almost certainly violate international law while generating an immense diplomatic backlash from Mexico and other nations.[33]

Ultimately, direct actions against the Mexican cartels in Mexico creates a question of international law.[34] The situations in which a state lawfully may use force against or inside another state are well rehearsed: when the UN Security Council has authorized that force, when the other state has given consent, or when the first state is acting in self-defense.[35]  Under Article 51 of the UN Charter, there exists an inherent right to self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations.[36]  Additionally, “the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council[.]”[37]

The next issue is determining what constitutes an “armed attack” according to international law.  Could the flow of fentanyl and its deadly consequences reach the threshold of an “attack” consistent with international law?[38]  Realistically, the dangers of fentanyl and the fallout of synthetic drug production is not likely to reach the threshold of an “attack” that would justify self-defense under international law[39]

However, passing stricter regulations for importing precursor chemicals into Mexico could help limit the flow of essential components of fentanyl production.[40]  Leveraging diplomatic power with the UN Commission on Narcotics could lead to greater difficulty manufacturing the drug in other countries.[41]  Another socioeconomic solution could include creating more opportunities within Mexico as an alternative to working for the cartels.[42]  This requires more than just increasing public funding in rural and urban communities, but consistent reforms to the community itself.[43]  Examples such as increased training for police units, workforce development, and stronger, more secure elections in cartel-controlled areas could change the environment where the cartels operate, limiting the cartels’ workforce and political power. [44]

Cartel activity goes beyond just synthetic drug production. However, the impact of the Fentanyl crisis in North America, and the increasing demand for synthetic drugs globally has created a public health risk that requires more than direct action against cartel operations.[45]  Therefore, an approach that can address public health and public safety is necessary to accomplish this goal.[46]

 


[1] Christian Penichet-Paul, Illicit Fentanyl and Drug Smuggling at the U.S.-Mexico Border: An Overview, National Immigration Forum, https://immigrationforum.org/article/illicit-fentanyl-and-drug-smuggling-at-the-u-s-mexico-border-an-overview/ (Oct. 25, 2023).

[2]Narco Files: The New Criminal Order, The Highway to Europe, https://cdn.occrp.org/projects/narcofiles-the-new-criminal-order/en/# (last visited Jan. 27, 2024).

[3]Audrey Travere & Jules Giraudat in Culiacan, Revealed: how Mexico’s Sinaloa cartel has created a global network to rule the fentanyl trade, The Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/dec/08/mexico-cartel-project-synthetic-opioid-fentanyl-drugs (Dec. 8, 2020).

[4] Christopher Newton, Will Designating Mexican Crime Groups as Terrorists Help Fight Them?, InSight Crime, https://insightcrime.org/news/will-designating-mexican-crime-groups-terrorists-help-fight-them/ (Apr. 5, 2023).

[5] Id.

[6] Id.

[7] Id.

[8] Id.

[9] Id.

[10] Id.

[11] Id.

[12] Mexico’s Long War: Drugs, Crime, and the Cartels, Council on Foreign Relations, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/mexicos-long-war-drugs-crime-and-cartels (updated, Sep. 7, 2022).

[13] Id.

[14] Id.

[15] Id.

[16] EUROPOL, Mexican cartels bringing drug expertise to the EU, new report finds, https://www.europol.europa.eu/media-press/newsroom/news/mexican-cartels-bringing-drug-expertise-to-eu-new-report-finds (Dec. 14, 2022).

[17] Vanda Felbab-Brown, The Foreign Policies of the Sinaloa Cartel and CJNG-Part V: Europe’s supercoke and on-the-horizon issues and the Middle-East, Brookings, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-foreign-policies-of-the-sinaloa-cartel-and-cjng-part-v-europes-supercoke-and-on-the-horizon-issues-and-the-middle-east/ (Sep. 16, 2022).

[18] Id.

[19] Id.

[20] Id.

[21] Vanda Febab-Brown, The foreign policies of the Sinaloa Cartel and CJNG Part II: The Asia-Pacific, Brookings, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-foreign-policies-of-the-sinaloa-cartel-and-cjng-part-ii-the-asia-pacific/ (Aug. 5, 2022).

[22] Id.

[23] Id.  

[24] Vanda Felbab-Brown, The China connection in Mexico’s illegal economies, Brookings, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-china-connection-in-mexicos-illegal-economies/ (Feb. 22, 2022).

[25]  Id.

[26] Id.

[27] Id.

[28] Penichet-Paul, supra, note 1.

[29] Newton, supra, note 4

[30] Id.

[31] Id.

[32] Id.

[33] Id.

[34] Ashley Deeks & Matthew Wexman, Using Force Against Mexican Drug Cartels: Domestice and International Law Issues, Lawfare, https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/using-force-against-mexican-drug-cartels-domestic-and-international-law-issues (Dec. 18, 2023).

[35] Id.

[36] UN Charter, art. 51,  https://legal.un.org/repertory/art51.shtml

[37] Id.

[38] Deeks & Wexamn, supra note 34

[39] Id.

[40] U.S. Leadership Coalition, Combatting the International Dimensions of the Opioid Crisis, https://www.usglc.org/combating-the-international-dimensions-of-the-opioid-crisis/#:~:text=Through%20concerted%20international%20engagement%2C%20U.S.,in%20other%20nations%20increasingly%20difficult. (July, 2019).

[41] Id.

[42] Id.

[43] Id.

[44] [44] Vanda Felbab-Brown, How to Win Mexico’s Drug War, Brookings, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/how-to-win-mexicos-drug-war/#:~:text=Of%20course%2C%20the%20most%20effective,sustainable%20jobs%20will%20be%20hard. (Mar. 27, 2010).

[45] Id. 

[46] Id.

Jake Babbish